strategy where all the elements of national power were directed to support the nation's national security strategy. Since World War II, many of the conflicts the U.S. has engaged in have not been a coordinated U.S. Government (USG) effort to win these conflicts. In fact, many U.S. departments and agencies seem to play no role or only a minor role in such conflicts. Many of the problems identified with reconstruction and stabilization during the Iraq War can be attributed to the lack of qualified USG personnel with expertise in areas where the military lacks sufficient expertise. Our military has attempted to pick up the shortfall in interagency support, but it lacks the expertise that the U.S. Government could provide to succeed in these peace-making operations. This research provides recommendations to reform the U.S. Government's interagency process to support contingency operations.
REFORMING THE INTERAGENCY COORDINATION PROCESS IN SUPPORT OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
[W]ar is a continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other means…war itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different…war cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs…the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.
-Carl von Clausewitz
Would an Interagency "Goldwater-Nichols-type" initiative enhance the integration of all U.S. Government elements of power in pursuit of national security objectives?
The United States is currently engaged in a two wars; we live in a dynamic threat environment that is becoming increasingly violent, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous
(VUCA). In his 2006 National Security Strategy, President Bush declared:
America is at war. This wartime national security strategy responds to the grave challenge we face--the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11, 2001 . This strategy reflects our Government's most solemn obligation to protect the security of the American people.
2 Accordingly, Joint Staff Pub 3-08 states that:
Success in operations will depend, to a large extent, on the ability to blend and engage all elements of national power effectively. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, political and/ or diplomatic, and informational entities of the US Government (USG) as well as nongovernmental agencies. 3 The Joint Staff thus acknowledges this VUCA environment and understands that for the United States to achieve its national security objectives all elements of national power--along with those of allies, intergovernmental, non-governmental, and regional organizations--must operate in unison. So the U.S. Government must collectively support this effort to attain national security objectives in a coherent manner. This mandate was clearly articulated in the 1947 National Security Act:
Congress created the National Security Council to advise the President on integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security and to facilitate interagency cooperation. 4 The United States must now determine the viability of the National Security Act of 1947 for the 21 st Century VUCA security environment. In 1947, the primary threat against the United States was Russia and later China, which led to small-scale skirmishes around the globe. Today the threats against the United States are multifaceted and dynamic, not just from nation-states but also from extremist groups and organizations as well. Should the role of the National Security Council (NSC) be only to advise the President on integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security and to facilitate interagency cooperation? The problem with the current NSC is that it is too busy working policy issues, but it has no mechanism to ensure the execution of the President's policies. No one with any statutory authority besides the President is in charge of the span of control and coordination that goes across agencies, and the President of the United States is too busy to work day-to-day implementation activities to ensure the US Government executes his decisions.
Execution of policy has become the responsibility of the President's staff, but not the President. However, the President's National Security Advisor is not capable of performing this function because this individual is:
The Presidents National Security Advisor serves as the chief advisor to the President of the United States on national security issues. This person serves on the National Security Council within the Executive Office of the President. The President appoints the National Security Advisor without confirmation by the United States Senate. As such, they are not connected to the bureaucratic politics of the Departments of State and Defense, and are therefore able to offer independent advice. The power and role of the National Security Advisor varies from administration to administration. The federal government has archaic, vertical, "stove-pipe" organizational structure and processes that severely undermine success in operations and policy implementation. We are unable to achieve unity of effort and a whole-of-government approach to devising solutions to critical problems. Today's world is extremely complex and requires the horizontal integration of efforts from a variety of departments and agencies in our executive branch. National level reform of the interagency process is urgent, yet we have not even begun. It is unrealistic to expect the executive branch to reform itself. Administrations are too busy with day-to-day operations to see the need for change and presidential directives are insufficient and ineffective for this level of reform. Authorities and appropriations must be properly aligned to create flexibility and enable agile integrated solutions to the complex threats of the new century. Congress must drive reform, in a manner similar to that achieved by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 that created horizontal structures and processes in the Department of Defense. While Congress is part of the solution, it is also part of the problem and requires similar reform of its own. Piecemeal independent reform efforts are inadequate. It is vital to our national and homeland security that we produce a new National Security Act, with executive directives, and an interagency mechanism in Congress. actions to preserve the nation's security. Yet no current law directs the rest of the U. S.
Government (USG) to develop complementary contingency plans to support such actions. Ultimately, the planning process should produce unified USG plans to support contingencies; all concerned agencies should be fully involved in the planning process.
During the shape 13 and deter 14 phase of a contingency plan (Figure 1 above), the USG must persuade a potential adversary that it is not in its best interest to go to war with the United States. To achieve this deterrence, all elements of national power must work in a coordinated manner to ensure that potential adversaries understand the U.S.
interest in this issue. In these two phases, the entire Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic (DIME) spectrum of USG instruments of national power must produce a coordinated plan with the same objectives. If an adversary fails to heed this message, a USG contingency plan should be implemented to seize the initiative. 15 During the seizethe-initiative phase, U.S. military and diplomatic powers will assume a greater role, but the other elements of national power must also actively support this effort. As the contingency plan moves into the Dominate 16 Phase, the DOD assumes the primary role.
However, the diplomatic, information, and economic elements of DIME, should work in concert with the military to continue their support during this phase of the operation.
When a decision is made to move from the military Dominate Phase to Stabilize 17
Phase, the diplomatic, information, and economic instruments of DIME begin to assume a more proactive role, with the military working in concert with their efforts. During the initial stabilization phase, due to the possibility of ongoing hostile activity, the military may remain in control of all DIME activities. However, the military cannot fulfill all critical obligations without the active physical presence of the other elements of national power, supported by the subject matter expertise the USG departments and agencies. As the Enabling 18 Phase begins, the USG DIME equally employs all elements of national power working to support the President's National Security Objectives. During this phase, the military is no longer in the lead; rather all elements of national power are working in unison to meet the nation's security objectives.
As stated previously, the USG currently lacks a coherent and coordinated approach to overseas pre-and post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization policy. As There is the matter in how we approach interagency reform. We will only improve our alliances, avoid conflict, and take advantage of opportunities if we are making use of all parts of our American strength--everything that makes this nation great. As incredible as our military is, it cannot do all things, and the other parts of our government need some work. When we look where we are in Iraq today, and where we are in Afghanistan, the root of many of our problems lie in the fact that we are unable to bring much of our national power to bear on the challenges confronting us there. Even now, we need teams of diplomats, development experts, and other specialist in fields such as rule of law, engineering, and agribusiness to accompany our soldiers in the tasks of rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the State Department and other agencies you would expect to play a significant role cannot deliver experts in the number required, and so our soldiers have had to take up the slack. The question of who should be in charge of U.S. Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R) operations is a key facet in accessing the suitability of many models. At the highest level, civilian leadership in the person of the President is readily apparent and universally acknowledged. However, the relationships among other top--level interagency officials are not clear. In particular, the span of control and authority of both the senior civilian representative ambassador or President's Special Representative (PSR) -and the senior military commander in the field is often hard to define. Past experience, has shown that one cannot be formally subordinate to the other. By law, PSR's have authority over civilian agencies and operations in the field. For some operations, it may be possible to appoint an overall civilian leader from the outset, especially for purely humanitarian operations or where ceasefire or peace agreements are in place. With these scenarios, suitable models should provide for civilian-led interagency efforts at the operational level. In other situations, it will be imperative for the military to lead initial reconstruction since combat operations might continue or have to be renewed because of insurgent actions. The military will need interagency support as they restore order, triage post-combat uncertainty, and head off instability or anarchy. In such instances, military leadership of the initial interagency effort is essential. Suitable models should provide for interagency support to Combatant Command (COCOM) -led Stabilization and Reconstruction operations for these situations. Ambassadors, Governor's, and their staff's immediate access to GAS to coordinate interagency activities on behalf of the President. The GAS Staff would operate with a core staff of civilian and military professionals. I propose that the NSC's GAS Staff, as a minimum, must be organized as indicated in Figure 6 below: Additionally, the ultimate goal of the GAS is to ensure that the Federal Government employs the DIME efforts of the interagency like a symphony orchestra that supports the President's National Security Strategy by ensuring the effective implementation of his policies. The National Security Council includes experts at developing policy;
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however, its major shortcoming is in the implementation of the policy that its sets. This is due to a variety of factors:
-No standard for NSC structure; each President that comes into office has the freedom to change the NSC to meet his preferences and objectives.
-The NSC Staff rotates when the current administration changes office, so there is very little continuity of operations.
Additionally, the benefits sought in the National Security Act of 1947 have simply not been fully realized:
The National Security Act of 1947 mandated a major reorganization of the foreign policy and military establishments of the U.S. Government. The Act created many of the institutions that Presidents found useful when formulating and implementing foreign policy, including the National Security Council (NSC In conclusion, Congress should attend to the words of former CJCS General John Shalikashvili: "[I]n my view, the most important area for improvement is the emergence of a broad reform movement focused on our national security structure and the entire interagency process?" 27 He further observed:
[P]roblems in the interagency arena today remind me very much of the relationship among the services in 1986. We need an agreed-on, writtendown, well-exercised organization and a set of procedures to bring the full capability of the Department of Defense and all the relevant government departments and agencies to bear on the complex crises to which future presidents might commit us. 14 Deter. The intent of this phase is to deter undesirable adversary actions by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force. It differs from deterrence that occurs in the "Shape" phase in that it is largely characterized by preparatory actions that specifically support or facilitate the execution of subsequent phases of the operation/campaign. Once the crisis is defined, these actions may include mobilization, tailoring of forces and other predeployment activities, initial overflight permission(s) and /or deployment into a theater, employment of ISR assets; and development of mission-tailored C2, intelligence, force protection and logistics requirements to support the JFC's CONOPS, CCDRs continue to engage multinational partners, thereby providing the basis for further crisis response. Liaison teams and coordination with OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs assist in setting conditions for execution of subsequent phases of the campaign. Many actions in the "Deter" phase build on activities from the previous phase and are conducted as part of SCPs and activities. They can also be part of stand-alone operations. Joint Publication 3.0, IV-27. 15 Seize Initiative. JFCs seek to seize the imitative in combat and noncombat situations through the application of appropriate force capabilities. In combat operations this involves executing offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the enemy to offensive culmination and setting the conditions for decisive operations. Rapid application of joint combat power may be required to delay, impede, or halt the enemy's initial aggression and to deny their initial objectives. If an enemy has achieved its initial objectives, the early and rapid application of offensive combat power can dislodge enemy forces from their position, creating conditions for the exploitation, pursuit, and ultimate destruction of both those forces and their will to fight during the "Dominate" phase. During this phase, operations to gain access to theater infrastructure and to expand friendly freedom of action continue while the JFC seeks to degrade enemy capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity. In all operations, the JFC establishes conditions for stability by providing immediate assistance to relieve conditions that precipitated the crisis. Joint Publication 3.0, IV-28. 16 Dominate. The "Dominate" phase focuses on breaking the enemy's will for organized resistance or, in non-combat situations, control of the operational environment. Success in this phase depends upon overmatching joint force capability at the critical time and place. This phase includes full employment of join force capabilities and continues the appropriate sequencing of forces into the operational area quickly as possible. When a campaign is focused on conventional enemy forces, the "dominate" phase normally concludes with decisive operations that drive an enemy to culmination and achieve the JFC's operational objectives. Against unconventional enemies, decisive operations are characterized by dominating and controlling the operational environment. Dominate phase activities may establish the conditions for an early favorable conclusion of operations or set the conditions for transition to the next phase of the campaign. Joint Publication 3.0, IV-28-29. 17 Stabilize. This phase is required when there is limited or no functioning legitimate civil governing entity present. The joint force may be required to perform limited local governance, integrating the efforts of other supporting/contributing multinational, OGA, IGA, or NGO participants until legitimate local entities are functioning. This includes providing or assisting on the provision of basic services to the population. The "Stabilize" phase is typically characterized by a change from sustained combat operations to stability operations. Stability operations are necessary to ensure that the threat (military and/or political) is reduced to a manageable level that can be controlled by the potential civil authority or, in noncombat situations, to ensure that the situation leading to the original crisis does not reoccur or its effects are mitigated. Redeployment operations may begin during this phase and should be identified as early as
